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Abstract: It has long been recognized that voters bring their political behaviors in line with
economic assessments. Recent work, however, suggests that citizens also engage in economic
behaviors that align with their confidence – or lack thereof – in the political system. This alignment
can happen consciously or, as we suggest, unconsciously, in the same way that positivity carries
over to other political behaviors on a micro-level. Using monthly time series data from 1978 to
2008, we produce further evidence of this relationship by demonstrating that political confidence
affects consumer behavior at the aggregate level over time. Our analyses employ measures that
capture nuanced shifts in the public while simultaneously accounting for the complex relationships
between subjective and objective economic indicators, economic behavior, political attitudes, and
the media. Our results suggest that approval of the president not only increases the electorate’s
willingness to spend money, but also affects the volatility of this spending. These findings suggest
that the economy is influenced by politics beyond elections, and gives the “Chief Economist”
another avenue by which they can affect the behavior of the electorate.
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Politics and economics are closely intertwined. Scholars have written hundreds of articles
about the political consequences of macroeconomic conditions, including studies of election
outcomes (Fiorina 1978; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981), macropartisanship (Lockerbie 1989;
MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989), and presidential approval (Kernell 1978; MacKuen et al.
1989). It is clear that the economy, both directly and indirectly, has a major impact on political
attitudes and behaviors.
Much of the literature has assumed this relationship to be one-directional, with economic
conditions leading to political attitudes and behavior (e.g., Kiewiet 1983; MacKuen, Erikson, and
Stimson 1992). We suggest, however, that this assumption is theoretically and empirically
unjustified: in much the same way that political behaviors (e.g., voting) are influenced by
economic perceptions, citizens’ economic behaviors are also affected by political attitudes. In
particular, we find that increasing approval of the president leads to increased spending in the
aggregate, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy for the electorate. At the same time, this increased
approval generates greater volatility in spending, a natural function of the increased role
motivation plays in spending decisions as mean levels of income (i.e. ability) increase.
While previous research has shown that political evaluations can affect economic
perceptions (e.g., De Beof and Kellstedt 2004), the present analysis contributes to a growing
body of evidence demonstrating a direct link to economic behavior at both the individual (Enns
and Anderson 2009; Gerber and Huber 2010) and aggregate (Gerber and Huber 2009) levels.
Economic evaluations are an important component, but they do not tell the whole story: political
optimism affects both economic attitudes and behaviors. This type of emotional carry-over effect
is common in political and other contexts, and we argue that the political economy is no
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exception. After all, “voters and consumers are essentially the same people. Mr. Smith buys and
votes; he is the same man in the supermarket and the voting booth” (Tullock 1976).
The present analysis begins by outlining the relationship between economic and political
indicators, focusing on recent work that demonstrates how political attitudes influence economic
behavior. In doing so, we highlight existing explanations for this link, while offering up our own
theoretical approach at the micro-level (i.e., carry-over effects) for observing such a relationship
in the aggregate. Employing monthly time series data from 1978 to 2008, our analyses expand
upon this nascent body of work by using measures more directly tied to the constructs of interest
to examine the complex relationships between subjective and objective economic indicators,
political attitudes, and the media. Our theoretical model also lends itself to a system of equations,
enabling us to address questions of causality and endogeneity. The results have a number of
implications, not least of which is that the picture painted of the political economy by prior
studies is incomplete. More concretely, this effect provides presidents with a more pliable
method of manipulating the economy – indirectly through approval rather than directly through
economic policies.
The Political Determinants of Mean Consumer Spending
While the literature on political outcomes has consistently demonstrated the importance
of the economy (Fiorina 1978; Kernell 1978; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lockerbie 1989;
MacKuen et al. 1989), the economic literature, in stark contrast, has generally ignored political
attitudes and behaviors. A prototypical example comes from Ludvigson (2004), who forecasted
changes in consumer spending using only lags of consumer sentiment. Other studies have
incorporated borrowing and taxation rates as well as other forms of financial innovation while
omitting political factors (e.g., Blinder 1981; Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel 2006). Indeed, when
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politics have been explicitly considered in analyses of consumer behavior it is typically limited
to major shocks (e.g., the Gulf War, 9/11) that are included to absorb variance in the series, not
as variables of interest in and of themselves (e.g., Garner 1991).
This oversight is likely due to the assumption that the relationship between politics and
economics is a one-way street, with economic attitudes influencing political behavior, but not the
other way around. Yet many politicians speak as if the reverse were true, implying a very
different causal relationship in their communications and campaign messages. For example,
President Carter’s infamous “malaise” speech argued that the root of the economic downturn and
gas shortages was a “crisis of confidence” in America that, if restored, would set the country on a
positive economic trajectory once more. Reagan’s “Morning in America” ad also played on this
theme, arguing that the country was “prouder and stronger and better” under Reagan’s
leadership, resulting in lower unemployment, interest rates, and inflation. In the extreme, the 16day government shutdown in October of 2013 was blamed for reducing holiday spending and
slowing the economic recovery. A survey conducted during this time revealed that citizens
agreed with such rhetoric: roughly 40% of Americans reported cutting back on their spending as
a result of lowered confidence in the political system (Chung 2013).
From a theoretical standpoint, political optimism might only affect economic behavior
through expectations: citizens first become more optimistic or pessimistic about the economy in
reaction to a change in partisan control in Washington; they then behave according to these
updated expectations by increasing or decreasing their spending, in a self-fulfilling prophecy.
This theoretical perspective has been put forth by Gerber and Huber (2010), particularly in the
context of elections. Partisans “believe that their party is of better quality, and when their party
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wins an election [they] become more optimistic about the economy and alter their consumption
decisions and personal happiness in response to that expected improvement” (p. 168).
There is certainly empirical support for the idea that political attitudes affect economic
behavior indirectly through economic attitudes. Most prominently, De Boef and Kellstedt (2004)
have demonstrated that increasing presidential approval leads to more optimistic economic
attitudes. These findings are echoed in Ladner and Wlezien (2007), who found that the expected
electoral success of one’s party colors prospective economic evaluations (see also Evans and
Pickup 2010). In turn, a large literature demonstrates that consumer sentiment shapes economic
behavior, including consumer spending. While we are not aware of any studies examining this
causal chain in its entirety, there is convincing evidence that at least some of the relationship
between presidential approval and economic behavior is mediated by economic attitudes.
Yet standard measures of economic perceptions and consumer confidence comprise only
part of what determines actual spending (Katona 1968). According to one analysis, the Index of
Consumer Sentiment (ICS) explained only 14% of changes in actual consumer spending between
1954 and 1993 (Carroll et al. 1994). Ludvigson (2004) similarly notes that aggregate consumer
confidence is a good indicator of present economic conditions, but does not provide much
predictive value beyond standard economic indicators (see also Kellstedt, Linn, and Hannah
2015). In other words, a great deal of variance in consumer behavior is left unexplained by
economic perceptions.
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One reason for this discrepancy is that spending is a function of ability and motivation,
whereas the ICS tends to emphasize only the former. 1 Furthermore, scholars have recently
proposed that political attitudes can directly account for some of this variance. Enns and
Anderson (2009), for example, argue that political attitudes directly impact economic behavior
because people seek to be consistent in their attitudes and behaviors. In other words, individuals
tailor their behavior – economic or otherwise – to their attitudes in order to avoid cognitive
dissonance. Using consumer survey data collected during the 2000 presidential election, they
found that respondents’ partisanship predicted spending, with “winning” partisans increasing and
“losing” partisans decreasing spending, an effect driven entirely by voting citizens.
A direct relationship between political attitudes and economic behavior has also been
demonstrated at the aggregate level, with sales increasing in counties more heavily populated by
partisans of the winning party over the course of elections (Gerber and Huber 2009). Because
this boost in consumer spending appears shortly before the election, “citizens appear to be
adjusting their consumption based on expected income rather than today’s income” (p. 424).
This adds credence to the notion that while consumer sentiment is an excellent reflection of

1

Ironically, as Kellstedt, Linn, and Hannah (2015) point out, Katona argued that income and

assets measure ability to spend and proposed the attitudinal ICS specifically as a measure of
willingness (i.e., motivation). Yet four of the five questions focus on objective realities and
ability (e.g., “would you say that you are better off or worse off financially than you were a year
ago”); the one question closest to ascertaining motivation and willingness asks “do you think
now is a good or bad time for people to buy major household items” rather than “do you plan” or
“are people interested in buying” these items.
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current economic conditions, actual consumer behavior is affected by political optimism and
pessimism.
On a macro scale, a substantial literature in comparative politics has also demonstrated
that political certainty and stability leads to greater economic growth, specifically by boosting
the rate of private investment and other factors associated with economic expansion (e.g., Aisen
and Veiga 2006; Alesina et al. 1996; Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992; Ozler and
Tabellini 1991). In other words, the more confidence the electorate has in the political system,
the better the economy. Of course, these analyses examine a much wider range of political and
economic situations; nonetheless, we see no reason why these relationships would not hold up in
a more nuanced fashion with a more restricted range of political confidence.
Within the American context, we do not explicitly reject the notion of cognitive
dissonance, however we believe it much more likely that this effect is due to optimism or
pessimism in one domain seeping unconsciously into other domains. 2 Research on decisionmaking has shown that incidental (i.e., unrelated) emotions have carry-over effects that impact
subsequent behavior, often outside of one’s awareness (e.g., Loewenstein and Lerner 2003;
Lerner, Small, and Loewenstein 2004). For example, consumer researchers have found that
relative to a neutral baseline, sad individuals demanded higher prices in exchange for a good but
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Enns and Anderson (2009) examined whether mood could explain the observed changes in

consumer behavior, and found no significant change in happiness after the election. However,
they do not test whether happiness directly predicts spending and, in any case, the question is
quite broad (i.e., “I’m very happy with my life as it is”) and does not speak to confidence in the
political system.
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were willing to sell it at a lower price. The authors suggest that this means events such as 9/11
“could actually encourage rather than discourage consumer spending” (Lerner, Small, and
Loewenstein 2004: 340). Other research has also found that sad individuals are willing to spend
more on a purchase than neutral ones (Cryder, Lerner, Gross, and Dahl 2008). This relationship
was moderated by a general orientation toward money: sad consumers who were “spendthrifts”
spent more while “tightwads” spent less (Rick, Cryder, and Lowenstein 2007), with the latter
outnumbering the former 2 to 1.
At a glance such findings appear counter to our argument, but there are two critical issues
to consider. First, while happiness and enthusiasm are the opposite valence of sadness, this does
not mean that they would have the opposite impact on consumer spending. Indeed, much of the
research on incidental emotions has been conducted in the context of appraisal theories, which
hold that emotions of the same valence (e.g., anxiety and anger) have different effects on
behavior, while emotions with different valences can lead to similar behaviors (e.g., Han, Lerner,
and Keltner 2007). Second, sadness is a relatively uncommon emotional reaction in American
politics. Not surprisingly, most of the research on appraisal theories of emotions in a political
context has focused on fear, anger, and/or enthusiasm. Regardless, we believe that a drop in
presidential approval does not indicate sadness so much as it does disappointment in and/or
anger with the political system.
We are unaware of any publicly available research that has examined the impact of
happiness or enthusiasm on spending decisions (as opposed to how spending impacts happiness,
on which there are many interesting published studies). There is, however, some survey and
experimental evidence demonstrating that enthusiasm affects domain-specific behaviors, such as
political participation (Brader 2005; Marcus and MacKuen 1993). Certainly happiness appears to
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increase heuristic thinking and “shallow” thought processing (Brader 2005), and positive
emotions generally are affiliated with approach behaviors (Marcus and MacKuen 1993).
As a result, we expect increases in political satisfaction to be associated with increases in
consumer spending. Moreover, we hold that an electorate confident in the direction of the
country should engage in greater spending as a matter of course, rather than consciously and
explicitly aligning economic decisions with political attitudes as a form of coping with cognitive
dissonance. Given that experiments have typically found subjects to be unaware of the fact that
incidental emotions affected their behavior, we believe that this process plays out on a similarly
unconscious and implicit level outside the lab.
Of course, our times series data cannot test whether consumer spending is affected by
approval consciously or unconsciously. Nonetheless, this theory generates expectations in the
aggregate, ones that we seek to observe while simultaneously addressing some weaknesses of
prior research. For one, the survey data employed by Enns and Anderson asked about specific
categories of consumption that, while important indicators of spending (i.e., food, transportation,
and entertainment), comprise only a quarter of total expenditures. Other studies demonstrating
that political attitudes affect economic behavior have employed measures of intended – but not
actual – holiday and vacation spending (Gerber and Huber 2010). At the aggregate level, Gerber
and Huber (2009) used county-level taxable sales that, while exhibiting “no apparent geographic
or attrition bias” (p. 412), covered slightly more than half the states, and likely contained some
measurement error due to cross-county/state purchases and the reporting of sales – though, as
they note, such error would serve to attenuate any results. Regardless, it is clear that employing a
more complete and direct measure of consumer spending would serve to bolster these findings
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and provide greater confidence in the idea that political attitudes and economic behavior are
directly linked.
Similarly, previous analyses have focused exclusively on partisanship (Enns and
Anderson 2009; Gerber and Huber 2010) or proxies of partisanship (Gerber and Huber 2009) as
a measure of political attitudes. Although informed by partisanship, the theoretical concept of
interest is approval of and satisfaction with the government. Theoretically, partisanship is
relatively stable (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) and more indicative of one’s identity
(e.g., Greene 2004) than satisfaction with the present political system. Empirically, satisfaction
with the government varies over time in response to political events and the public’s approval of
political actors involved in these events. As a result, we employ presidential approval as our key
independent variable, given that it is more closely linked with the theoretical concept of interest.
Beyond the Mean: Incorporating Volatility into Models of Economic Behavior
Our focus on trends rather than cross-sectional data not only allows us to analyze shifts in
the public’s attitudes and spending over time, but also enables us to consider the volatility of
these trends. Robert Engle acknowledged in his 2003 Nobel lecture that political factors such as
elections and wars can affect the volatility in financial markets (see also Canes-Wrone and Park
2012). Yet while a number of studies have examined the causes of volatility in economic
variables, these analyses have, much like the macroeconomic literature generally, ignored the
potential impact of politics (e.g., Christiansen et al. 2012; Dhawan and Jeske 2006).
When it comes to predicting the volatility of consumer spending specifically, the
literature is fairly thin. On one hand, some scholars have found that greater political instability –
as defined by changes in control of executive power in a country – is associated with higher
volatility in inflation (Aisen and Vega 2006). Others who have examined how mean levels of
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political variables affect economic volatility, however, have found that higher levels of
democracy are associated with lower volatility in GDP (Mobarak 2005). Moreover, how these
results relate to our research questions is not entirely clear, as these studies employ neither
presidential approval nor consumer spending in their models.
At the same time, analyses that examine mean levels of political attitudes as a function of
economic volatility have generally found a positive relationship between the two. In particular,
these studies reveal that increasing volatility in the stock market is associated with increased
presidential approval (Schwartz, Hoover, and Schwartz 2008; Chong, Halcoussis, and Phillips
2011). The “basic idea is simply that in times of uncertainty, people act to support the President,”
akin to a rally round the flag effect (Schwartz et al. 2008, 200). Similarly, Chong and colleagues
note that while “it is intuitive to assume that a decrease in market volatility will result in a higher
approval, we notice that it is during times of economic uncertainty… when the market is looking
toward the president for leadership, that we witness a positive causal relationship” (2011, 394).
Closely related work finds a similar association, with worsening mean levels of economic
conditions leading to decreases in the volatility of presidential approval (Gronke and Brehm
2002; although see Kriner and Schwartz 2009). In other words, negative economic conditions
appear to stabilize political opinions, while positive economic events lend themselves to greater
unpredictability in the electorate.
Based on this work we expect a similar relationship, albeit in the reverse causal direction:
whereas low presidential approval simultaneously dampens consumer spending and decreases
the volatility of spending, high levels of approval should not only lend itself to increased
spending, but also greater volatility in that spending. Rather than a rally round the flag effect,
however, we suggest that volatility is positively associated with presidential approval for more

11

practical reasons. In particular, if presidential approval increases the level of spending, then it
will also inherently increase the variance in spending. The lower spending is, the more ability
plays a role in spending and the less motivation or willingness matters. Conversely, as sentiment
(i.e., ability) and thus spending increases, motivation comes to play a more important role,
motivation that varies across people and over time.
Theoretical Expectations
Given the complex nature of the political economy, Figure 1 summarizes the
hypothesized relationships between the political and economic attitudes and behaviors in the
model. 3 First, a large literature has demonstrated that objective economic indicators (Fiorina
1981; Kernell 1978; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979) and subjective economic evaluations (De Boef
and Kellstedt 2004; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; MacKuen et al. 1992) affect political
evaluations. Similarly, the chief factors in modern time series models of consumer spending are
objective economic indicators (Carroll 1992; Poterba and Samick 1995; Romer 1990). The
effects are similar to those found in approval models, with consumer spending increasing as the
economy improves and declining as economic conditions worsen.
-- Figure 1 About Here -Beyond the impact of objective economic indicators, it is clear that economic behavior is
also affected by subjective economic evaluations (Carroll et al. 1994; Gelper et al. 2007;
Ludvigson 2004; Starr 2008). We suggest that when political confidence is high, as measured by

3

The complexity of the relationships described in Figure 1 also raise concerns about

endogeneity, a question we address in a later section.
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high presidential approval ratings, consumer spending will also increase; conversely, low
presidential ratings should depress consumer spending (H1).
In addition to impacting changes in average consumer behavior, we anticipate that
presidential approval will also affect the volatility in consumer behavior. Previous work has
found that increased economic volatility is associated with increased presidential approval,
though it has focused on approval as the dependent variable. Thus, as the mean level of
presidential approval increases, volatility in consumer spending should also increase (H2).
Data and Methods
The analyses that follow explore whether political attitudes and the stability of these
attitudes directly impact the economy using monthly data that spans from January of 1978
through December of 2008. In operationalizing the macroeconomy, we follow the mainstream
economic literature by measuring our dependent variable in terms of personal consumption
expenditures (PCE). 4 PCE include all household purchases of goods and services made by
residents in the U.S. In turn, expenditures comprise approximately two-thirds of the country’s
domestic spending and “are by far the most important single item of aggregate demand”
(Vuchelen 2004: 494). As such, PCE are the engine of economic growth and play a vital role in
affecting both the unemployment and inflation rates, among other indictors of economic health.

4

The data on total personal consumption expenditures were gathered from the Bureau of

Economic Analysis’ “National Income and Product Accounts” (2009), publicly available online
at http://www.bea.gov/national/. Measured in billions of dollars and seasonally adjusted, the data
have also been adjusted for inflation to constant 2008 dollars.
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As shown in the first panel of Figure 2, expenditures have experienced relatively steady
growth during the period of examination; however, the short-term changes in PCE are difficult to
see. Thus, the second panel presents PCE after it has been differenced, highlighting the median
monthly change of over 13 billion dollars.
-- Figure 2 About Here -To measure our key independent variable, presidential approval, we use the percentage
of respondents according to Gallup Polls who approve of the president’s handling of his job each
month. Subjective economic evaluations are measured using the University of Michigan’s
Survey of Consumers Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS). Although recent research suggests
that the individual components may be better predictors of consumer spending than the index as
a whole, indices are also more reliable than individual survey questions (Kellstedt et al. 2015). 5
We measure the objective economy by including those factors commonly used in models of
consumer spending, such as inflation and unemployment rates, along with real disposable income
(RDI), and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA).

5

We nonetheless re-ran the model with the two business conditions questions (e.g., Kellstedt et

al. 2015) and personal prospections (see fn. 1) one at a time in lieu of the index. The components
exhibited unique relationships with spending, but in each case the results of interest were
substantively and statistically unaffected. We thus use the index; results using the components
are available from the authors upon request.
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In addition, we include political and economic events as interventions to explain shocks
to the series not accounted for by other variables in the model. 6 Similarly, the model includes
variables indicating the first two months of a new presidential administration, the honeymoon
period, and elections. Finally, a voluminous literature shows that the media play a central role in
both economic perceptions (e.g., Soroka, Stecula, and Wlezien 2015; De Boef and Kellstedt
2004) and presidential approval (e.g., Brody 1991; Nadeau et al. 1999). As a result, we control
for media sentiment toward the president, as measured by separate counts of positive and
negative mentions in The New York Times. The data were coded for sentiment using the Lydia
system. 7

6

These interventions were identified by examining the ARFIMA residuals. Only the most

extreme events were included to avoid overfitting.
7

This system has been used by other scholars and institutions as an indicator of media sentiment.

Most prominently, beginning in the fall of 2007, the Annenberg National Election Study
included daily summary data generated by Lydia to capture information about each presidential
candidate and relevant issues, providing a snapshot of the campaign for the day respondents
completed the survey. Studies of the system’s internal validity can be found in a variety of
sources. An overview of the technical aspects of the process can be found in Bautin, Ward, Patil,
and Skiena (2010). For details about the aggregation process, see Bautin, Ward, and Skiena
(2009). For a discussion of the sentiment analysis, see Bautin, Vijayarenu, and Skiena (2008) and
Godbole et al. (2007). A technical discussion of the spatial analysis can be found in Bautin et al.
(2010). Readers may also see Online Appendix A for a general discussion of the Lydia system.
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All variables were differenced by their respective values of d to create stationary series
(Granger 1980). 8 An attempt to specify lag structure using statistical significance to eliminate
insignificant lags runs the danger of curve-fitting. 9 Rather than rely on post hoc decisions, lag
lengths were chosen by examining the log-likelihood and AIC for a variety of specifications.
Based on these results, contemporaneous effects were included for all variables, and two-month
lags were included for all political, economic, and media variables. 10
Traditional autoregressive fractionally integrated moving average techniques explore
only the first moment of a series, yet we are also interested in the stability of expenditures.
Because Engle’s LM test indicates the presence heteroskedastic errors, also known as an
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (ARCH) process, a multivariate ARCH-M

The media coverage variables also act as micro-event detectors, picking up events –
political and otherwise – that relate to the president. This allows us to include changes in the
political environment in a more parsimonious fashion, reducing the number of interventions in an
already complex model.
8

See Online Appendix B for integration tests and the values of d used to difference each series.

9

Likewise, specifying the lag structure a priori requires assumptions about the behavior of the

political and economic variables that are difficult to justify theoretically.
10

Multicollinearity is certainly a concern for time series data, as variables may share a common

trend over time. Although this is true when variables are included as regressors in their level
form, differencing the data removes any time trend, thus limiting the correlation between
variables (Gujarati 2004, 367).
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specification was used to estimate the model. 11 The ARCH-M specification allows conditional
volatility to affect the mean of expenditures (Engle, Lilien, and Robins 1987). To account for the
long-term equilibrium relationship between disposable income, subjective economic evaluations,
and consumption, a fractional error correction mechanism (FECM) is included (Grant and Lebo
2016; Lebo and Grant 2016). 12 The ARCH-M model includes equations for the mean, or amount
of spending, as well as the conditional volatility. We first discuss the results of the mean
equation, followed by the ARCH parameters and conditional volatility results.
Mean Results
As shown in Table 1 and in line with H1, the mean of consumer spending is significantly
impacted by presidential approval. The relationship is substantively quite powerful: a 1% change
in fractionally differenced approval results in a contemporaneous increase of $2.47 billion, or

11

The model has a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.07, indicating no significant autocorrelation

remaining. The residuals are also white noise, with a Ljung-Box Q statistic of 14.6 at a lag of 20.
The results for the models run using first differences instead fractional differencing techniques
are presented in Online Appendix D. The results remain substantively unchanged.
12

A table of cointegration tests can be found in Online Appendix C. We follow the procedures

discussed in Grant and Lebo (2016) and Lebo and Grant (2016) to test for cointegration. The
fractional differencing parameter for the FECM is 0.61. Although PCE and RDI do not meet
traditional standards of cointegration in our data, they are treated as cointegrated in the
economics literature and are included in our FECM (e.g., Davidson, Hendry, Srba, and Yeo
1978; Lettau and Ludvigson 2001). PCE and approval do not show evidence of cointegration
and, as such, approval has been excluded from the FECM.
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26.8%, of the mean monthly change in fractionally differenced expenditures. Moreover, the
effect of increased approval persists the following month, resulting in an additional increase in
spending. A standard deviation change in fractionally differenced approval – 4.8 points – leads to
almost twice the mean change in fractionally differenced expenditures over two months. The
magnitude and persistence of this effect allows political perceptions to play a large role in
shaping economic behavior.
-- Table 1 About Here -With respect to the other political variables, we see that honeymoons have no significant
impact on spending, while elections have a more qualified one. Consumers respond to positive
political evaluations and elections contemporaneously, but the effect of elections does not reach
traditional levels of significance. However, the direction of the effect conforms to previous
research finding a positive relationship between elections and spending (Gerber and Huber 2009;
Enns and Anderson 2009).
With respect to objective economic indicators, rising inflation has a negative effect on
PCE, significantly reducing expenditures over two months. This decrease in expenditures due to
adverse economic conditions is to be expected: when goods and services cost more, consumers
spend less. The unemployment rate, while not reaching traditional levels of significance, reduces
expenditures in the short term, but there is no lagged effect. Similarly, as the DJIA and
disposable income increase, PCE increases as well. That is, as the market improves and stocks
are worth more, consumers are able to spend more, although this effect is only marginally
significant for the stock market. Not surprisingly, changes in objective economic indicators
account for a larger percentage of the monthly change in PCE than do the political variables.
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Nevertheless, even when accounting for these traditional variables, presidential popularity plays
a substantively significant role in predicting macroeconomic conditions.
While PCE responds to objective economic indicators, it also reacts to the nonfundamental factors, or “animal spirits” (Keynes 1936), as reflected in the ICS. The month
following an increase in sentiment, expenditures also increase. In line with prior research, this
shows that consumption expenditures depend not just on the availability of money – the ability to
spend – but also on consumers’ willingness to spend. When the economy is perceived as
improving, expenditures increase the following month. Conversely, when the economy is
perceived as performing poorly, even if that perception is not in line with objective economic
indicators, consumers will be less willing to spend because they fear conditions may worsen.
There is also a significant error correction between income, economic sentiment, and
expenditures, indicating the three are in long-term equilibrium; 26.6% of the distance between
the three series disappears a month after they are driven apart by an exogenous shock.
Interestingly, we also find that positive media sentiment contemporaneously exhibits a
negative relationship with spending, but positively predicts increases in spending one month out.
Similarly, negative media coverage is simultaneously associated with greater spending but leads
to reductions in spending a month later. We suspect this may be a function of measuring
presidential sentiment, which takes longer to filter through the system and bleed over into
economic activity than news that is directly about the economy. However, further investigation
of this point is beyond the scope of this paper.
The significant ARCH parameter shows evidence of volatility clustering, or periods of
high volatility grouping together (Engle 2003). We have modeled the mean of expenditures as a
function of risk using an ARCH-M specification. We would expect volatility, indicating
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economic uncertainty, to have a negative effect on overall spending, and this is borne out in the
data: as volatility increases, overall expenditures decrease. These results are consistent with work
in economics showing that economic uncertainty leads citizens to tighten their belts.
Volatility Results
While we explored the variables affecting how much consumers spend in the mean
equation, those same factors can affect the stability, or volatility, of economic behavior. Turning
now to the volatility model, and as hypothesized in H2, the relationship between approval and
expenditure volatility is positive. Just as in the mean equation, increased approval leads to a
contemporaneous increase in expenditures. Honeymoons also have a similar, positive
contemporaneous effect, albeit not at traditional levels of significance. Nevertheless, when
political evaluations are high, volatility in consumer spending increases.
Also aligning with the results of the mean equation, increases in inflation dampens
volatility in expenditures. Meanwhile, consumer sentiment and disposable income, both positive
indicators of economic health, have a positive and significant effect on volatility. Thus, as with
mean levels of approval, the increased ability to spend enables citizens’ motivation and
willingness to spend to play a greater role, creating greater volatility in the series. Similarly, as
the economy shrinks and spending ability declines, so, too, do the fluctuations in spending.
Although marginally predictive of the mean of consumption expenditures, the
unemployment rate does not have a significant effect on volatility in expenditures. The stock
market is a similarly insignificant predictor of expenditure volatility. By including previously
neglected political factors, it appears that the explanatory power of objective economic
conditions has been reduced.
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Instability in consumption expenditures is further influenced by the tone of the media’s
coverage of the president. As the president is portrayed more positively in one month, variance
in PCE declines. The opposite is true of negative mentions: the more negative coverage a
president receives, the more economic uncertainty increases. However, both are corrected by a
significant rebound effect the following month. While these media effects account for a
relatively small percentage of instability in PCE, they are further evidence of politics (as filtered
through the media) affecting economic uncertainty.
Temporal Ordering and the Problem of Endogeneity
The theoretical model laid out in Figure 1 is not the first of the macro-political economy
(e.g., Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal 1993). Often such studies create large-scale models that
address both short- and long-term effects but fail to account for endogeneity, and a similar
criticism could be levied against the preceding analysis. For instance, one potential source of
endogeneity is simultaneity bias due to a reciprocal relationship between presidential approval,
consumer sentiment, and consumer spending. If the relationship is indeed reciprocal and this is
not taken into account when estimating the model, estimates will be both biased and inefficient.
We have theoretical reasons to expect this relationship to be unidirectional. As discussed
previously, we view this effect as an emotional spillover in which increasingly optimistic citizens
are also more willing to open their wallets. And while there is an intriguing string of research
showing that behaviors can affect one’s mental state (e.g., smiling to increase feelings of
happiness), it is clear that the standard flow of events is from attitudes and perceptions to
behaviors – in this case, from political attitudes to economic behaviors.
We also have statistical reasons to expect the relationship to be unidirectional.
Specifically, we can gain purchase on the temporal ordering of events using Granger-causality
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testing. If including past values of x improves predictions of y over those made solely based on
past values of y, x is said to Granger-cause y. These Granger causality tests, displayed in Table 2,
indicate that approval and consumer sentiment Granger cause changes in PCE. Based on these
results, we feel confident changes in approval and consumer sentiment temporally precede
changes in PCE. Likewise, we can rule out bidirectional Granger-causality.
Although we have demonstrated that changes in these variables occur in time before
changes in PCE, we must still explore whether a single-equation FECM modeling strategy is
justified. In order to use a single equation when there is a cointegrating relationship, one of the
components of the FECM must be weakly exogenous to the other (Charemza and Deadman
1997; Erricson and Irons 1994; Engle, Hendry, and Richard 1983). Table 2 shows that PCE is
weakly exogenous to consumer sentiment, however the other component of the FECM,
disposable income, is not weakly exogenous to PCE. As a result we need to specify an equation
for the marginal process of RDI that includes an FECM and estimate the equations
simultaneously. 13

13

To test for weak exogeneity, models were first specified for the marginal processes (e.g.

consumer sentiment). These models were then estimated including an error correction
mechanism (ECM) from the PCE model. If the marginal process is weakly exogenous to PCE,
the ECM should be statistically insignificant. The next step is to include the residuals from the
marginal process equation (estimated without the ECM) into the PCE model. A statistically
insignificant coefficient for the residuals fails to reject the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity.
Although not a component of the FECM, we included presidential approval in our weak
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-- Table 2 About Here -In addition to the two equations we have as a result of our exogeneity testing, we also
have two endogenous explanatory variables: presidential approval and consumer sentiment.
Similar to the penultimate chapter of Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson’s The Macro Polity (2002),
we create a large-scale model of the political economy that includes both short- and long-term
effects. Unlike Erikson et al. (2002), however, all our variables are measured monthly. This
common time interval enables us to employ the multiple equation formulation that brings us
closer to what these authors herald as the “ideal representation” (p. 386) of the macro-political
system. Thus, rather than resorting to simulations as they do, we model multiple equations
simultaneously.
In particular, we specified equations for the marginal processes of the endogenous
explanatory variables, with theoretically informative priors determining the inclusion or
exclusion of variables from each equation. These equations were estimated along with equations
for PCE and RDI in a four equation near-VAR using seemingly unrelated regression. Table 3
presents the results from a variety of specifications of the PCE equation, including the results of
the near-VAR. 14
-- Table 3 About Here --

exogeneity testing as a robustness check of our exclusion of this variable from the FECM. For a
formal discussion of weak exogeneity, see Online Appendix E.
14

The results for the models run using first differences instead fractional differencing techniques

are presented in Online Appendix F.
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The results of the mean equation from Table 1 are presented in the first column of Table
3; the second column is an FECM model of the mean of PCE. Comparing these two columns
allows us to see the degree to which the estimates of the mean are affected by estimating the
variance equation and allowing conditional volatility to affect the mean of spending. While
approval remains significant in the FECM model, the magnitude of the effect is diminished and
operates at a lag. Moving from the FECM model to the third column that contains the PCE
results from the near-VAR estimation, we are struck again by the consistency of the findings.
Regardless of our modeling strategy, the results suggest presidential approval has a significant
and substantively meaningful impact on consumer spending. There are, of course, many other
ways to model consumer spending; we have tried to balance both theoretical and empirical
considerations in our choices, and the robustness of the results across these models gives us
additional confidence in our findings.
Discussion
As an effort to stave off the impending “Great Recession,” President Bush signed into
law the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, giving each taxpayer a rebate of up to $600. The hope
was that the extra income would lead to increased consumer expenditures, thus jumpstarting the
flagging economy and avoiding a prolonged recession. Bush’s concern with boosting consumer
spending was not misplaced: consumer expenditures comprise the lion’s share of domestic
spending, driving economic growth and ultimately affecting other objective indicators of
macroeconomic health (Vuchelen 2004; NIPA 2009). In creating this Act, political actors –
much like economists – were focusing on the role objective economic conditions play in
economic behavior. But in assuming that spending is exogenous to political evaluations, both
have overlooked the possibility that politics matter for the economic health of the country.
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Our results indicate that economic behavior can be affected by the political system not
only through direct measures such as the Stimulus Act, but also by boosting optimism and
confidence in the system itself. This effect is not trivial: aggregated across the population,
spending can increase or decrease by billions of dollars as a result of typical changes in
presidential approval. Such results demonstrate that the economic consequences of political
systems occur not just in extreme situations, as highlighted by research in comparative politics,
but also in stable and enduring democracies that experience relatively minor changes in political
attitudes. Our results also extend the nascent literature on the political determinants of spending
by using direct measures of the concepts of interest with data spanning four decades and five
presidential administrations. The use of direct measures and time series data gives us added
confidence that the impact of political attitudes on economic behavior, found to exist previously
in cross-sectional studies, is substantive and enduring.
One implication of these results is that previous studies of approval have likely overstated
the influence of economic conditions. Certainly there is no question that the economy, and
perceptions of the economy, are important forces in political evaluations. Yet the economy itself
is partially driven by confidence in the political system, thus creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.
When political times are good, happy citizens spend freely; when times are bad, citizens tighten
their belts and hunker down. This type of spillover effect is common in our daily life, and
spending decisions are no exception.
Our findings also lend credence to the popular conception held by citizens and espoused
by many politicians that the president has a great deal of power when it comes to economic
conditions. Given the complexity of the American economy, one could easily argue that it is
unfair or even ignorant that the economy plays such a large role in the electoral fortunes of
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candidates. Yet here we see that citizens do not just reward and punish their representatives for
the state of the economy, but also they respond in kind to their increasing or decreasing approval
in the “Chief Economist.” By most accounts, the 2008 tax rebates had a modest impact on the
economy, as many citizens opted to save it or use it to pay down debts. Our results suggest that
this is a limited view of the tax rebates, and the economy may have benefitted more indirectly
from increased approval of Bush as a result of the rebates than directly from the rebates
themselves. The connection between approval and spending gives the president an important
point of leverage, and one that would seem to be more directly and easily manipulated than
objective economic factors.
This study also moves beyond previous analyses focusing on mean levels of spending by
explicitly considering volatility. We find that increased approval leads to not only increased
spending but also increased volatility in that spending. Though counterintuitive on its face, such
results are in line with previous research showing a positive association between political
attitudes and economic volatility. When approval is low and citizens are saving rather than
spending, volatility in spending must also be low: money will continue to be spent on nondurable necessities, but motivation to spend becomes less relevant to spending decisions. As
approval and spending increases, volatility will also increase as motivation comes to play an
increasingly important role vis-à-vis ability.
By the same token, our results indirectly relate to recent analyses of the Index of
Consumer Sentiment. Research by Kellstedt et al. (2015) demonstrates that the ICS as a whole is
a reliable measure of consumer sentiment, but in some instances will mask the impact of
economic perceptions on spending. Their analysis reveals that prospective, sociotropic
assessments of the economy predicts spending on durable goods, when the composite index
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reveals no such relationship. Since many durable goods (e.g., household appliances, cars) tend to
be large, non-essential purchases (as opposed to non-durable, essential, and comparatively cheap
goods such as food, clothing, and gas), we expect motivation to play a critical role in such
expenditures. Thus, if we are willing to accept that the ICS captures motivation to spend (which
we do not, though that is a question for another day), we should not only see its components are
stronger predictors of durable than non-durable spending, but also we should witness higher
volatility in that spending. Our analysis, which examines spending on both type of goods
combined, should be somewhere in the middle: motivation is an important but qualified
moderator of spending.
One interesting but unanswered question from this analysis is whether the effect of
political approval on spending is asymmetrically impacted by partisanship. Previous research has
demonstrated that not all citizens respond equivalently: for example, survey data regarding the
impact of the 2000 election on spending demonstrated that spending increases among
Republicans and decreases among Democrats were driven entirely by voters (Enns and Anderson
2009). It would not be surprising to see that increased approval for out-partisans increases
spending far more than comparable increases for in-party identifiers (see, for example, Kriner
and Schwartz 2009). Conversely, if our theory is correct, we should not see asymmetry when it
comes to the volatility of spending: Republicans and Democrats alike should be equally affected
by lowered approval and restricted spending. Unfortunately, while presidential approval is
available by party identification, we are unaware of any data on consumer spending over time
broken down by party identification, which would provide an additional test of our theory.
Similarly, it would not be surprising to see that this effect is to some degree non-linear,
and that approval impacts consumer spending more at some levels than others. For example, it is
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plausible that increases in approval have a greater impact at the mid-point than at very low or
high levels of approval, in the sense of diminishing marginal returns (or losses). Alternatively,
perhaps the relationship between approval and spending is greater in the latter part of a
president’s administration, when citizens’ attitudes are more crystallized. In other words, a jump
in approval at the end of a president’s term is more “real” than one at the beginning (although see
Gronke and Brehm 2002). Although beyond the scope of this paper, we find such questions to be
compelling and worth pursuit.
Moreover, as any study suffers from limitations, ours is no exception. On one hand, the
use of aggregate time series data allows us to overcome a number of problems in answering our
research question. While spending is, at its core, the result of individual level decisions, it is
national PCE that creates economic movement. Moreover, individual-level data is plagued with
problems such as response bias and measurement error, problems that are diminished when
responses are aggregated (Kramer 1983). On the other hand, and as noted at the outset, the use of
such data prevents a direct test of our proposed theoretical mechanism. Although individual
analyses that find similar results assuages these concerns to a degree (Enns and Anderson 2009;
Gerber and Huber 2010), a focused test of how economic behavior is affected by political
evaluations would be of value. Indeed, individual-level and specifically experimental data is
ultimately needed to convincingly demonstrate the particular spillover effect we hypothesize
here. The theories of cognitive dissonance and emotional spill-over could be tested against one
another by manipulating dissonance or affect and measuring willingness to spend.
Moreover, the data were initially collected in the middle of President Obama’s first term,
thus why the series end in 2008. Given the events that happened near the end of these series and
shortly thereafter, one might wonder how well the results hold up when there are greater shocks
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to the system than what we observe here. Indeed, whether the relationship between approval and
consumer spending is stronger or weaker in times of severe recession would be an interesting
finding either way. We leave this important and interesting question for another day.
Regardless of the theoretical mechanism, it is increasingly clear that politics is not simply
affected by economics, but also influences it, as well. Incorporating political variables can
sharpen forecasts of economic behavior and highlight the important role political attitudes play
in determining economic outcomes. This perspective also helps to explain how the president
might impact the economy beyond direct measures, and provides evidence of carryover effects
on a large scale. As we stated at the outset: politics and economics are closely connected; our
results contribute to a growing body of work showing this to be even more the case than
previously thought.
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Table 1: Model of Monthly Personal Consumption Expenditures, 1978-2008
Mean Equation
Political

Coefficient

(Std. Error)

p-value

Approval
Approval t-1
Approval t-2
Honeymoon
Honeymoon t-1
Honeymoon t-2
Election
Election t-1
Election t-2

2.470*
1.243*
-0.584
34.845
-5.408
-19.357
27.315
-16.112
12.680

(0.695)
(0.619)
(0.451)
(48.460)
(30.205)
(47.348)
(21.414)
(32.671)
(22.137)

0.000
0.023
0.098
0.236
0.429
0.342
0.101
0.311
0.284

Inflation
Inflation t-1
Inflation t-2
Unemployment
Unemployment t-1
Unemployment t-2
ICS
ICS t-1
ICS t-2
Dow Jones
Dow Jones t-1
Dow Jones t-2
Real Disp. Income
Real Disp. Income t-1
Real Disp. Income t-2
Media & Other Events
Positive Sentiment
Positive Sentiment t-1
Positive Sentiment t-2
Negative Sentiment
Negative Sentiment t-1
Negative Sentiment t-2
DJIA Crosses 2000
September 11th
FECM
Constant
Volatility Equation
Political
Approval
Approval t-1
Approval t-2
Honeymoon
Honeymoon t-1
Honeymoon t-2
Election
Election t-1
Election t-2

-17.253*
-27.187*
-11.909
-23.799
-7.644
-17.569
-0.744
1.571*
-0.948
0.006
0.014
-0.011
0.267*
-0.255*
-0.088*

(7.520)
(7.418)
(9.848)
(16.858)
(20.303)
(17.548)
(0.740)
(0.858)
(0.707)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.012)
(0.050)
(0.063)
(0.050)

0.011
0.000
0.114
0.079
0.354
0.159
0.158
0.034
0.090
0.271
0.078
0.163
0.000
0.000
0.040

-0.232*
0.138*
-0.015
0.211*
-0.128*
-0.069
119.615*
-191.510*
-0.266*
70.252*

(0.072)
(0.061)
(0.048)
(0.077)
(0.065)
(0.048)
(23.439)
(30.128)
(0.046)
(19.322)

0.001
0.012
0.380
0.004
0.025
0.075
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.050*
0.014
-0.009
1.302
-0.103
-0.607
0.619
-0.244
0.325

(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.009)
(0.834)
(0.446)
(1.079)
(0.498)
(0.833)
(0.595)

0.001
0.177
0.169
0.060
0.408
0.287
0.107
0.385
0.293

Economic
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Economic
Inflation
0.045
Inflation t-1 -0.364*
Inflation t-2 -0.239
Unemployment
-0.242
Unemployment t-1
0.019
Unemployment t-2 -0.143
ICS
-0.015
ICS t-1
0.039*
ICS t-2 -0.010
Dow Jones
0.000
Dow Jones t-1
0.000
Dow Jones t-2 -0.000
Real Disp. Income
0.004*
Real Disp. Income t-1 -0.002
Real Disp. Income t-2 -0.003*
Media
Positive Sentiment -0.006*
Positive Sentiment t-1
0.003*
Positive Sentiment t-2 -0.002
Negative Sentiment
0.006*
Negative Sentiment t-1 -0.003*
Negative Sentiment t-2 -0.001
Constant
6.299*
ARCH
0.073*
ARCH-in-Mean
-0.082*
Durbin Watson = 2.07
N = 369
* p ≤ 0.05 (All tests one-tailed)

(0.156)
(0.162)
(0.197)
(0.398)
(0.430)
(0.423)
(0.019)
(0.020)
(0.016)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)

0.386
0.013
0.113
0.272
0.482
0.368
0.212
0.024
0.273
0.266
0.321
0.057
0.001
0.058
0.002

(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.125)
(0.034)
(0.033)

0.000
0.003
0.073
0.001
0.011
0.248
0.000
0.016
0.007
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Table 2: Granger Causality and Weak Exogeneity Tests
Granger Causality
Approval  PCE
Consumer Sentiment  PCE
PCE  Approval
PCE  Consumer Sentiment
Weak Exogeneity*
Approval weakly exog. to PCE
Consumer Sentiment weakly exog. to PCE
Consumer Sentiment weakly exog. to Disposable Income
Disposable Income weakly exog. to PCE
*T-test (p-value), two tailed.

F-test
3.14
3.17
0.25
2.09
ECM
-0.001 (0.80)
0.001 (0.44)
0.000 (0.79)
0.072 (0.25)

p-value
0.01
0.01
0.91
0.08
Residuals
0.25 (0.74)
-1.58 (0.08)
0.37 (0.83)
-0.28 (0.04)
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Table 3: Specifications of the Mean of Personal Consumption Expenditures, 1978-2008
ARCH-M
Coeff.
p-value
(Std. Err.)

FECM
Coeff.
p-value
(Std. Err.)

Near-VAR
Coeff.
p-value
(Std. Err.)

Political
Approval
Approval t-1
Approval t-2
Honeymoon
Honeymoon t-1
Honeymoon t-2
Election
Election t-1
Election t-2

2.470*
(0.695)
1.243*
(0.619)
-0.584
(0.451)
34.845
(48.460)
-5.408
(30.205)
-19.357
(47.348)
27.315
(21.414)
-16.112
(32.671)
12.680
(22.137)

0.000

-17.253*
(7.520)
-27.187*
(7.418)
-11.909
(9.848)
-23.799
(16.858)
-7.644
(20.303)
-17.569
(17.548)
-0.744
(0.740)
1.571*
(0.858)
-0.948
(0.707)
0.006
(0.009)
0.014
(0.010)
-0.011
(0.012)
0.267*
(0.050)

0.011

0.023
0.098
0.236
0.429
0.342
0.101
0.311
0.284

0.092
(0.330)
0.606*
(0.337)
-0.265
(0.331)
0.456
(12.837)
-11.426
(11.173)
-0.563
(12.111)
3.139
(9.532)
-6.394
(11.668)
2.426
(10.981)

0.390

-18.113*
(4.059)
-6.588
(4.381)
-0.167
(4.583)
-22.344*
(9.661)
-22.645*
(10.138)
-11.727
(9.592)
0.077
(0.421)
0.296
(0.426)
-0.268
(0.408)
0.010*
(0.005)
0.013*
(0.006)
0.010*
(0.006)
0.126*
(0.027)

0.000

0.037
0.212
0.486
0.154
0.482
0.371
0.292
0.413

0.009
(0.314)
0.582*
(0.321)
-0.256
(0.315)
0.473
(12.226)
-11.065
(10.644)
-0.007
(11.526)
3.018
(9.073)
-6.945
(11.106)
2.492
(10.450)

0.489

-17.475*
(3.866)
-5.997
(4.174)
-0.602
(4.366)
-22.028*
(9.204)
-21.359*
(9.658)
-11.559
(9.138)
0.385
(0.400)
0.281
(0.405)
-0.271
(0.389)
0.010*
(0.005)
0.012*
(0.005)
0.010*
(0.005)
0.135*
(0.025)

0.000

0.035
0.208
0.485
0.150
0.500
0.370
0.266
0.406

Economic
Inflation
Inflation t-1
Inflation t-2
Unemployment
Unemployment t-1
Unemployment t-2
ICS
ICS t-1
ICS t-2
Dow Jones
Dow Jones t-1
Dow Jones t-2
Real Disp. Income

0.000
0.114
0.079
0.354
0.159
0.158
0.034
0.090
0.271
0.078
0.163
0.000

0.067
0.486
0.011
0.013
0.111
0.427
0.244
0.256
0.033
0.014
0.041
0.000

0.076
0.445
0.009
0.014
0.104
0.168
0.244
0.243
0.032
0.013
0.038
0.000
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Real Disp. Income t-1
Real Disp. Income t-2
Media & Other Events
Positive Sentiment
Positive Sentiment t-1
Positive Sentiment t-2
Negative Sentiment
Negative Sentiment t-1
Negative Sentiment t-2
DJIA Crosses 2000
September 11th
FECM
Constant

-0.255*
(0.063)
-0.088*
(0.050)

0.000

-0.232*
(0.072)
0.138*
(0.061)
-0.015
(0.048)
0.211*
(0.077)
-0.128*
(0.065)
-0.069
(0.048)
119.615*
(23.439)
-191.510*
(30.128)
-0.266*
(0.046)
70.252*
(19.322)

0.001

0.040

0.012
0.380
0.004
0.025
0.075
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

-0.188*
(0.046)
0.024
(0.027)

0.000

-0.011
(0.027)
-0.007
(0.027)
0.001
(0.027)
-0.010
(0.033)
0.021
(0.033)
0.004
(0.031)
122.546*
(21.277)
-179.821*
(21.277)
-0.286*
(0.046)
13.369*
(3.099)

0.346

0.185

0.398
0.484
0.237
0.498
0.450
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

-0.191*
(0.044)
0.024
(0.025)

0.000

-0.011
(0.026)
-0.006
(0.026)
0.002
(0.025)
-0.010
(0.032)
0.021
(0.031)
0.004
(0.030)
121.737*
(20.246)
-179.248*
(20.883)
-0.289*
(0.044)
12.980*
(2.950)

0.332

0.174

0.403
0.477
0.380
0.255
0.449
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

N = 369
* p ≤ 0.05 (All tests one-tailed)
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Figure 1: Theoretical Summary
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